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Abstract – This paper presents a model-based safety 
architecture framework (MBSAF) for capturing and 
sharing architectural knowledge of safety cases of safety-
critical systems of systems (SoS). Whilst architecture 
frameworks in the systems engineering domain consider 
safety often as dependent attribute, this study focusses 
specifically on sharing architectural knowledge of safety 
cases between stakeholders and managing safety in systems 
development. For this purpose, we adapt the A3 
architecture overview (A3AO) tool. The application is 
shown though the case study of Dutch high speed train lines 
and shows how to derive requirements from various 
stakeholders by carrying out iterative validations of the 
A3AOs. The implemented technique consists of systems 
modeling language-based (SysML) diagrams. Outcomes of 
the assessment lead to guidelines for two A3AOs. This 
results in increasing and effective interaction between 
stakeholders, more overview for managing safety 
complexity, more insight into finding required safety 
information, and therefore; an increasing efficiency in 
safety engineering. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The increasing complexity and interdisciplinarity of 
emerging Systems of Systems (SoS) -whose failure may 
cause injury or death to human beings- has resulted in a 
shift from document-based systems engineering to model-
based architecture frameworks. These frameworks manage 
system complexity, obtain system overview, encourage 
knowledge sharing, finding required system information, 
and enhance communication across disciplines and 
departments.  
Additionally, the rising number of safety-critical SoS 
goes along with a shift to transparency and a rising need of 
the general public for safety.  
In contrast, architecture frameworks in the systems 
engineering domain consider safety often as dependent 
attribute (A3AO, DoDAF, TOGAF) [1], [2], [3], and put 
safety more in the background, which could result in an 
incomplete safety analysis and therefore, an unsafe SoS. 
However, in software domain some frameworks have 
emerged that are primarily oriented on safety [4], [5], [6], 
[7], but they are not specifically focusing on sharing 
architectural knowledge, which is an essential factor for 
conducting a safety analysis of a large, complex and 
interdisciplinary SoS. A suitable approach to conduct the 
safety analysis for a safety-critical SoS which has become 
popular recently, is the safety case approach. It conducts an 
argument for why the system is safe by means of claims, 
evidence, arguments and inference rules. 
In order to deal with these challenges and impacts on 
performance and security which are also described by 
Chiprianov et al [8] this work attempts to redress the gap 
between the need to improve knowledge sharing during the 
establishment of a safety case and the missing centralization 
of safety in any architecture framework in the systems 
engineering domain. 
For this purpose, we want to focus specifically on 
enhancing communication across disciplines by improving 
the interaction between stakeholders to shorten the 
development cycle in setting up a safety case and therefore; 
increasing the efficiency in safety engineering. For this 
purpose, we adjust the A3 architecture overview (A3AO) 
tool described by Borches [1] to make it applicable to safety 
cases. Studies show that this approach is well perceived by 
users and successfully applied in many practices [1, chapter 
11], [9], [10]. It focusses on capturing and sharing 
architectural knowledge by making implicit knowledge 
explicit. In addition, in order to reach a large group of 
stakeholders, we use the systems modeling language 
(SysML) [11], due to its increased use in industry. 
In the first place, centralization of a safety case by 
allocating A3AOs to relevant meetings fosters focus and 
avoids idleness of stakeholders. 
Second, modification of the A3AO tool by allocating 
functions extracted from safety standards to one of the three 
views, provides insight and facilitates 
safety information and results in a c
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2. Background 
 
2.1 SoS under study 
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Figure 1. Data model of the FHA 
 
2.2 A3 architecture overview
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2.3 Bow-tie approach 
 
The proposed methodology for the functional view of one 
of is based on the bow-tie approach [14], which gained 
popularity [15], because of the simple overview of the 
different accident scenarios under analysis. A bow-tie 
diagram is represented by a top-event that can be 
considered as the accident, a list of potential threats on the 
left side of the top-event, and a list of the consequences on 
the right side of the top-event. It puts focus on the creation 
of barriers for discussing preventive (on the left-side) and 
corrective (on the right-side) elements. 
 
3. Method 
 
This study uses the well-known “Vee” process model, 
from which we use the methodology described by 
Blanchard and Fabrycky [16]. Requirements regarding the 
MBSAF are extracted from two sources: 1) Safety 
standards for architecting a complete safety case and; 2) 
Stakeholders for case-specific effectiveness. 
At first, we extract functions from safety standards so that 
the goals of the three main views of the A3AO tool will be 
adjusted.  
Hereafter, we perform a case study to derive 
requirements from various stakeholders. The participants 
consist of 9 stakeholders with backgrounds varying from 
safety engineers, domain experts and other stakeholders 
who were all involved in the process of the set-up of the 
safety case HSL-Zuid. The derived requirements are based 
on evaluations of stakeholders regarding interaction 
improvement by various diagrams that are set up during this 
study and finishes with 4 user-validations of the MBSAF. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Allocation to meetings 
 
It is important to make a clear distinction between the 
meetings because of the order of sequence in which the 
safety case must be established: defining the SoS of interest 
to analyze hazards in order to reduce risks.  
For this reason, the MBSAF will consist of 3 A3AOs, 
two of which are safety related, see Figure 2. These A3AOs 
must match the content of meetings (see section 2.1) to 
maintain focus. The overview on system descriptions has 
already been researched by Borches. This study only 
addresses the overview on hazard analysis and risk 
reduction.  
 
Figure 2. Allocation of A3AOs to meetings 
 
Next step is to modify the A3AO tool so that these 
functions can be fulfilled. For this, we use the HSL-Zuid as 
a basis. 
 
4.2 HSL-Zuid A3AO hazard analysis 
 
Function 2 and function 3 of the A3AO on hazard 
analysis contain functions, failure conditions and failure 
effects (also stated in Figure 1) making them automatically 
part of the functional view. For the HSL-Zuid, we start with 
a functional block diagram (FBD), because it can list 
functions, provide time-sequence and gives the possibility 
to include details on the interfaces between functions. A 
distinction between desired flow (normal scenario) and 
hazardous flow (failure scenario) is desirable as we want to 
indicate a hazard. To clarify the connections between 
function, flows and hazards, we include the FBD with 
flows, which results in a functional flow block diagram 
(FFBD) which also gives the possibility to cover function 3.   
Function 4 and function 5 are key parameters that are 
indicated by numbers or classifications, which means they 
must be part of the quantification view. For the HSL-Zuid, 
we choose a matrix to list the risks and THRs. Figure 3 
shows the 4 functions of the A3AO on hazard analysis of 
the safety case of the HSL-Zuid with the allocation to 
views. 
 
4.3 HSL-Zuid A3AO risk reduction 
 
Figure 3 also shows the A3AO on risk reduction only 
covers function 6. This function contains barriers for 
prevention or correction. These barriers are tailored to the 
identified functional hazards from function 2, which is 
shown as a feedback loop in Figure 3. Next to function 2, 
function 6 also needs input from function 5, to determine 
which functions must be included or excluded. For the 
HSL-Zuid, we use a bow-tie diagram as a functional view, 
because it can list functions, failed functions, causes and 
consequences, and preventive and corrective barriers, but 
especially because it puts focus on creation of barriers 
instead of identifying hazards (as was the case with the 
FFBD).  
4.4 HSL-Zuid Stakeholder requirements 
 
This study also addresses the design of the diagrams, 
views, and total A3AOs of the HSL-Zuid by 
implementation of user-centered requirements. These set 
out the need of all potential users by derivation of 
requirements from stakeholders through iterations of the 
A3AOs. These requirements enhance effectiveness and 
acceptation. According to Rajabalinejad [17], realization of 
stakeholders’ values and their ranking can be a challenging 
task due to a high number of stakeholders and their 
competing or conflicting interest. This means that these 
requirements are not only case-specific, but also 
participant-specific. The requirements are shown in Table 
1. 
 
Table 1. Stakeholder requirements for A3AO safety case of 
the HSL-Zuid 
 Requirement description Regarding 
1 Show preconditions and 
postconditions of the SoS 
Hazard analysis 
2 Show effects of failed 
components on other components 
because of stakeholder liability 
Hazard analysis 
+ Risk reduction 
3 Show allocation of hazards to 
responsible components 
Hazard analysis 
+ Risk reduction 
4 Show SoS total current risk status Hazard analysis 
+ Risk reduction 
5 Show hazard control assessment Risk reduction 
6 Show emergency and 
contingency arrangements 
Risk reduction 
 
 
Stakeholder requirement #1 is covered by making use of 
visual aids that give extra information about the 
preconditions of the first- and last function. 
Stakeholder requirement #2 indicates a need to get insight 
into the physical breakdown of the system to determine the 
relations between components to get insight into the 
responsibility of stakeholders. For the HSL-Zuid, we use a 
physical block diagram (PBD) to show relationships 
between components. 
In early stages of this study, we found out that a 
stakeholder loses attention whenever it is not clear if the 
relevant hazard is under his/her responsibility, which is 
defined in stakeholder requirement #3. For both functional 
views of the MBSAF of the HSL-Zuid, this can be achieved 
by making use of swimlanes, which are vertical or 
horizontal bands in the diagram that divide the diagram into 
logical areas or partitions, and –for the HSL-Zuid- make it 
possible to group functions to its responsible component. 
For the physical view and quantification view we choose to 
include the blocks, tables and graphs with the names of the 
stakeholders.  
Stakeholder requirement #4 about the SoS total current 
risk status can also be considered as a key parameter that 
can be included in the quantification view of both A3AOs. 
For the HSL-Zuid, we choose to present this in a table and 
graph. 
Earlier, we stated the possibility of bow-tie diagrams to 
present barriers. This diagram also gives the possibility to 
cover stakeholder requirement #5, as the methodology 
provides a presentation for failed vs. broken barriers, but 
also to cover stakeholder requirement #6, as the 
methodology also provides a presentation for creation of 
barriers for discussing preventive (on the left-side) and 
corrective (on the right-side) elements. 
Figure 3. Functional interfaces in the MBSAF 
4.5 MBSAF  
 
To capture the architectural knowledge of the HSL-Zuid, 
we set out guidelines, so that this MBSAF is reusable for 
similar safety cases.  
At first, the 7 steps that are defined by Borches remain 
valid. These are: collect system concerns, create top level 
view, decompose top level view, quantify key parameters, 
complete A3 model, summary, share, adapt and store.  
In contrast, these steps are no longer based on a system 
definition but on a safety case. This results in a change of 
goals and content of the three views in the A3AOs. The 
architectural knowledge of the A3AO on hazard analysis 
can be captured by: create functional view with identified 
functional hazards and functional consequences, and create 
quantification view with estimated risks and allocated 
THRs. The A3AO architectural knowledge on risk 
reduction can be captured by: create functional view with 
controlled hazards. 
With this in mind, the basis for capturing the architectural 
knowledge for both A3AOs from which can be built on is 
shown by the two A3AOs in Figure 4, which are used for 
the HSL-Zuid and can be seen as an example of the A3 
model for safety cases.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
Centralization of hazard analysis or risk reduction fosters 
focus, but subsequently also means that the A3AOs are 
always depending on each other and cannot be set up 
separately.  
Next to this, the functions that are used for allocation to 
one of the three views are extracted from a common safety 
method used in Railway domain, which may reflect domain 
dependency of this framework. Likewise, the diagrams we 
used for the three views of the HSL-Zuid also differ per 
case and per stakeholder making this framework less 
suitable for a large target group. Another factor that 
involves dependency is the fact that the predominant view 
on both overviews is the functional view. This is highly 
related to the nature of the safety analysis. A Functional 
Figure 4. MBSAF HSL-Zuid: A3AO hazard analysis upper-left, A3AO risk reduction lower-right 
Hazard Analysis is based -as the name suggests- on 
functional behavior. A safety analysis focusing more on 
physical behavior would likely result in another 
predominant view of the A3AOs.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Given the shift to transparency and the rising demands of 
the general public for safety, there is a need to demonstrate 
the safety level of the system by using the safety case 
approach.  
Here, we propose a model-based safety architecture 
framework (MBSAF) that centralizes hazard analysis and 
risk reduction in separate overviews to foster focus and 
avoids idleness of stakeholders, moving away from subjects 
that must be discussed to fulfill the stated purpose of the 
meeting and therefore; shortening the development cycle in 
safety case development. 
If we compare this MBSAF with traditional documents, it 
enhances collaboration and communication and provides 
support for managing system complexity and system 
overview. 
Nevertheless, the extraction of functions from safety 
standards used in Railway domain entails domain 
dependability for this framework. Taking into account other 
safety analyses that can be used to develop a safety case 
would more likely result in a more generic MBSAF. 
Next to domain-dependency, although user-requirements 
increase acceptation and effectiveness of the architecture 
framework, these requirements differ per safety case.  
The MBSAF captures and shares architectural knowledge 
of a safety case in A3AOs which results in increasing and 
effective interaction between stakeholders, more overview 
for managing safety complexity, more insight into finding 
required safety information, and therefore; an increasing 
efficiency in safety engineering. 
We plan to use this framework and apply it to other SoS 
safety cases. 
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